The Biopolitics of Asylum Law in Texas: The Case of Mexicans Fleeing Drug Violence in Juárez by ARIADNA ESTEVEZ LOPEZ
55
NORTEAMÉRICA, Year 8, Special Issue 2013
Recibido: 16/04/2013        Aceptado: 04/11/2013
The Biopolitics of Asylum Law in Texas: 
The Case of Mexicans Fleeing 
Drug Violence in Juárez1
ariadna estévez*
aBstract
Using Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower, this article examines the role of asylum law in 
the control of Mexican migration to the U.S., arguing that U.S. authorities are using asylum law 
as a new means of regulating Mexican immigration. The article relies on theoretical input and 
empirical data to prove that there are extra-legal and technical legal issues allowing for the 
biopolitical use of asylum law, usually linked to sovereign power. 
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resumen 
A partir del concepto de biopoder de Michael Foucault, este artículo examina el papel de las 
leyes de asilo para controlar la migración mexicana hacia Estados Unidos. Se argumenta que 
las autoridades estadunidenses están usando las leyes de asilo como un nuevo medio para re-
gular la inmigración mexicana. Se basa en herramientas teóricas y datos empíricos para de-
mostrar que existen tecnicismos legales y otros aspectos no circunscritos al ámbito legal, 
generalmente ligados al poder soberano que permiten el uso biopolítico de la ley de asilo.
Palabras clave: ley de asilo, inmigración, violencia a causa del narcotráfico, biopolítica, relacio-
nes México-Estados Unidos, estudios sociolegales.
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Thousands of people have fled the war against drug trafficking in Mexico (2006-
2012); over 700 000 persons have been displaced, 230 000 from the Juárez Valley in 
Chihuahua alone (Benavides and Patargo, 2012). Of those who left the Juárez Valley, 
150 000 are now in the United States (Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwe-
gian Refugee Council, 2011), and hundreds of asylum applicants have been unsuc-
cessful because U.S. courts systematically reject their petitions. Certain empirical 
studies suggest that the denial of asylum is linked to economic and political inter-
ests, since the U.S. government either does not wish to question the authority of its 
trading partner or does not want to open the door for the migration of nationals 
from countries that already represent a migration threat, as is the case of Mexico 
(Rosenblum and Salehyan, 2004; Ramji-Nogales, Schoelholtz, and Schrag, 2007; 
Camp and Holmes, 2009).
However, the focus of this article is not the empirical evidence that makes the 
case for identifying the political and economic interests leading to the denial of asy-
lum to Mexican citizens. Instead, it will focus on the role of asylum law in the bio-
politics of U.S. migration control and how it helps sustain those interests. It will ar-
gue that systematic rejection is related to the tactical use of asylum law in the 
migration dispositif (apparatus) of U.S. biopolitics, which treats Mexicans as a threat. 
It uses both theoretical input and empirical data (interviews with asylum seekers’ 
attorneys and asylum advocates) to advance its central argument. The case study 
used for analysis is international forced displacement in the Ciudad Juárez, Chihua-
hua-El Paso, Texas border region.2
The article will therefore first characterize and contextualize the broader migra-
tion panorama, the phenomenon of Mexican asylum seekers in the U.S. in general 
and El Paso, Texas, in particular. It will then discuss how biopolitics is a suitable 
framework for analyzing the managerial use of asylum law for regulating immigra-
tion into the U.S. Finally, it will discuss the legal and extra-legal components of asy-
lum law that are used as a biopolitical tactic in the Fifth Circuit migration courts to 
regulate Mexican political migration.
2  El Paso has been taken as case study since most asylum applications here are related to the problems dealt 
with here. Although in the U.S. the details and nature of cases are confidential, some activists and academ-
ics have revealed that, while many of the California cases involve indigenous people fleeing traditional 
political harassment in Oaxaca and Chihuahua and gender and sexual orientation-based persecution in 
conservative parts of Mexico, most cases registered in Texas, and particularly in El Paso, are related to 
violence resulting from the war on drugs in Ciudad Juárez.
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characterizinG and contextuaLizinG mexican asyLum cLaims
as part of the Broader phenomenon of miGration
The U.S. government and Pew Hispanic Center have agreed that the flow of undocu-
mented Mexican immigrants has slowed in recent years: in January 2008, there were 
an estimated 11.9 million undocumented immigrants in the country, but by January 
2009, that number had dropped by almost one million, possibly due to the fact that 
immigrants had decided to return to their countries of origin due to the economic re-
cession. By 2012, the migration rate from Mexico had dropped to zero percent accord-
ing to the Pew Hispanic Center, which stated, “The standstill appears to be the result 
of many factors, including the weakened U.S. job and housing construction markets, 
heightened border enforcement, a rise in deportations, the growing dangers associ-
ated with illegal border crossings, the long-term decline in Mexico’s birth rates, and 
broader economic conditions in Mexico” (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012). 
While undocumented crossings by Mexicans have decreased, in this period a new 
migration trend has appeared: forced displacement and asylum, especially in the con-
text of twin border cities such as Ciudad Juárez-El Paso. Drug-related violence in the 
Juárez Valley, among other cities considered strategic for the illegal drugs business, 
such as Nuevo Laredo, Morelia, Veracruz, and Monterrey, has led to shootouts, people 
being caught in the crossfire, decapitations, and the use of car bombs against govern-
ment authorities and rival gangs. In addition, kidnappings, extortion, forced disap-
pearances, and the execution of civilians have become daily occurrences. The human 
toll of this violence has been devastating, with the loss of over 100 000 lives (Ramírez 
de Alba, Solís, and De Buen, 2012) and the forced disappearance of 26 000 people (Am-
nistía Internacional, 2013). As for displacement, between 2010 and 2011 some 700 000 
people had to leave their homes as a consequence of generalized violence throughout 
the country and two percent of the Mexican population (over 1.6 million people) has 
been forcibly displaced by criminal violence (Benavides and Patargo, 2012). In the 
Juárez Valley alone, 230 000 people have been forced to abandon their homes with the 
majority seeking refuge in the U.S., especially Texas (Benavides and Patargo, 2012; 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, and Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011). 
In 2007, a year after the war on drugs was declared, 9 545 Mexicans requested asy-
lum, an increase of 41 percent compared to the previous year. Between 2006 and 2010, 
44 019 Mexicans applied, 13 700 of them in the United States and 30 142 in Canada. 
Until 2007, most Mexican asylum seekers chose Canada (74 percent) and to a lesser ex-
tent the United States (24 percent). However, by 2010, this trend had changed. The num-
ber of Mexican asylum claims in the United States increased in 2008 to 2 487; in 2009 
it remained almost the same, but in 2010 the number almost doubled (4 225) (United 
58
AriAdnA EstévEz
nortEAméricA
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). In contrast, in Cana-
da the number of Mexican asylum claims reached 9 413 in 2008, although by 2010 this 
number had dropped to 1 198, evidently due to the new visa requirement imposed 
on Mexican citizens (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010). While in 2001, only 50 Mexicans requested asylum in the United States, 
by 2007 the number had jumped to 1 830. In 2008, it rose to 2 487, and in 2009, to 2 422. In 
2010, the figure shot up to 4 225 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); by 2011, the claims had soared to 8 906, and in 2012, to 11 477 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011, 2012). By 2010, Mexico was 
responsible for one of the highest numbers of asylum requests in the United States, 
second only to China, and followed by Haiti, Guatemala, and El Salvador (usdoj, 2011).
According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (trac), in 2012 
over one-third of the court backlog of asylum applications were those of Mexicans 
(113 829 out of a total of 305 556), followed only by China, Honduras, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala. Except for the courts in Guam, in 2012 every U.S. American state 
processed applications from Mexicans; 60 percent of the cases were recorded in just 
four states: California, Texas, Illinois, and Arizona (2012a). Acceptance rates, on the 
other hand, are practically non-existent: in 2010, only 143 of 2 320 cases of affirmative 
asylum requests were granted (6.2 percent).3 The number of successful affirmative cas-
es decreased overall between 2008 and 2010 with 176 in 2008; 191 in 2009; and 143 in 
2010. In 2010, asylum was granted in just 49 of the 3 231 cases (1.5 percent). With respect 
to defensive asylum, the number of successful applications also dropped between 
2008 and 2010 with 72 in 2008; 62 in 2009; and 49 in 2010. A total of 85 percent of all 
asylum claims lodged between 2008 and 2010 were denied (Dzubow, 2012).
In El Paso, Texas, where hundreds of the cases linked to the war on drug traf-
ficking are to be found, Judges William L. Abbott and Thomas C. Roepke are respon-
sible for some of the highest denial rates in the country and have become even 
tougher since Mexicans rose to among the top of the asylum application lists (trac, 
2012b, 2012c). Abbott had a 65.7 percent denial rate in 2010, when nationals from 
Burma made up 19.7 percent of his caseload,4 but his denial rate rose to 74.6 percent 
in 2011 when Burma nationals were replaced by Mexicans, who represented 14 per-
cent of his caseload. For his part, Abbott rose in the national denial rankings from 
position 113 to 77 (trac, 2012c).5 In his 2010 report, Roepke denied asylum in 96.7 
3  The differences between affirmative and defensive asylum and how they constitute a managerial aspect of 
asylum law and policy are dealt with later in this article. 
4  Nationals from Burma were followed by nationals from El Salvador (10.7 percent), China (9 percent), Mexi-
co (8.2 percent), and Ethiopia (6 percent) (trac, 2012c). 
5  Other nationalities following Mexicans are El Salvador (13.5 percent), Burma (9.8 percent), China (6.2 per-
cent), and Somalia (6.2 percent) (trac, 2012c). 
59
The BiopoliTics of Asylum lAw in TexAs
essAys
percent of cases; Mexicans represented 12.4 percent of his caseload.6 In his most re-
cent report (trac, 2012b), the number of applications from Mexicans rose to 19 
percent,7 and his denial rate remained at 96.7 percent, although he did move up in 
the national rankings from fourth to third place on a list of 256 judges (trac, 2012b).
So, who are these Mexican asylum seekers whose cases are systematically reject-
ed? They are mostly local government authorities such as mayors and city council-
persons from all political parties who flee after colleagues and/or relatives have been 
killed in Ciudad Juárez or small towns in the Juárez Valley, which covers the munici-
palities of Praxedis Guerrero and Guadalupe Distrito Bravo. They also include police 
officers who have refused to participate in drug-related corruption; journalists the 
Mexican government is either unable or unwilling to protect; human rights and 
women’s rights activists persecuted by both criminals and state authorities; average 
citizens who have witnessed atrocities perpetrated by the army or drug gangs; wom-
en threatened by former partners who are drug traffickers; and small business own-
ers from the Juárez Valley who openly refuse to pay extortion or quotas. 
These people are anything but wealthy. Even those who do own property and 
capital flee suddenly, empty-handed, with nothing but the clothes on their backs 
and a couple of blankets if they are lucky. Neighbors or friends later notify them that 
their property or businesses have been vandalized or looted by armed men after their 
departure. At the end of the day, rich and poor alike arrive in El Paso with nothing 
more precious than their threatened lives. In order to apply for asylum some of these 
people manage to pay for a lawyer –not that there are many lawyers willing to take 
their cases. However, those who do find proper legal aid are among the pro bono cas-
es of attorney Carlos Spector, one of the few lawyers willing to defend what his col-
leagues and local legal ngos believe to be lost causes. Many of these are the clients of 
local ngos dealing with migration issues, such as Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy 
Center or the Diocesan Migrant and Refugee Services, which run group workshops 
on how to fill out the I-589 form (the application for asylum and withholding of re-
moval). They claim they cannot handle the work load –at least one family arrives 
every week– and that most cases will not succeed in court.
People without relatives in El Paso or Las Cruces who have managed to avoid 
detention –they hold visas and apply for affirmative asylum–, or were released im-
mediately on humanitarian parole, spend their first couple of months in shelters 
where food is scarce and not always good quality since it is often charity, essentially 
6  They are followed by Guatemala (10.7 percent), Honduras (10.7 percent), El Salvador (9.1 percent), and 
Jamaica (6.6 percent) (trac, 2012b). 
7  This number is followed by Honduras (10.5 percent), El Salvador (9.8 percent), Guatemala (9.8 percent), 
and Colombia (5.2 percent) (trac, 2012b). 
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leftovers provided by local businesses. In some cases, large families live in tiny flats 
in some of poorest areas of El Paso, Texas, or Las Cruces, New Mexico.
The systematic denial of asylum to Mexicans is related to what Anna Jessica 
Cabot, managing attorney for Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, claims to 
be “this feeling that when you start letting in Mexican citizens that experienced drug 
violence, then you’re opening the doors to hundreds of thousands of Mexican citi-
zens because drug violence is so pervasive in Mexico” (2012). Officials in Washing-
ton share this fear and support the use of biopolitical tactics, according to Carlos 
Spector, attorney-at-law and legal representative of dozens of Mexicans seeking asy-
lum in El Paso. He claims that cartels are acting as state agents and that victims as 
well as asylum authorities are aware of it. However, granting asylum to Mexicans 
would be tantamount to opening “Pandora’s Box,” he claims (2012).
To sum up briefly, data indicates that, while undocumented migration has 
slowed, a new migration trend related to drug violence has begun: application for 
asylum. While thousands of people have fled to other towns in Mexico, many others 
seek asylum in the U.S. These are not wealthy Mexicans, but Mexicans who are regu-
larly disciplined through security controls and are now biopolitically regulated 
through asylum law. That is, Mexicans are now regulated through the managerial 
use of asylum law, as will be discussed below.
expLaininG BiopoLitics and its Links 
to asyLum Law
While it was not Foucault’s intention to write a theory of power, he did venture an 
analytical philosophy of power that establishes how it works and its capabilities for 
subjection (Castro, 2004: 204). This analytical work focuses on differentiation systems, 
instrumental modalities, and how power is institutionalized. For Foucault, power is 
the conduct of conduct, since it is not exercised directly on people but by inducing, 
facilitating, hindering, limiting, and preventing their actions. Power relations become 
relations of domination when blocked using techniques that permit complete domi-
nation of the actions of others. Foucault identified the use of three types of power in 
European history: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower, and all three 
historical types of power overlapped rather than replaced each other (Foucault, 2000, 
2004; Foucault, Senellart, and Davidson, 2007). Whereas sovereign power is exer-
cised through legal apparatuses and disciplinary methods, biopower is enforced 
through a very different set of objectives, objects, rationality, apparatuses, strategies, 
and struggles or resistances.
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Biopower modifies the sovereign’s right to let live and make die, essentially in-
verting the relationship: instead of letting live and making die, the state now exercises 
the right to make live and let die.8 Through the use of these techniques the state does not 
replace disciplinary power, but incorporates it and takes it to another level or sphere 
of action where different devices are used. It addresses human life not in its individu-
al dimension but as a whole (the population as a species), which is fragmented in 
terms of race and ethnicity. While disciplinary power is focused on individual bodies 
(anatomo-politics), biopower focuses on processes specific to life itself, such as birth, 
death, reproduction, mobility, and disease. In biopower, the technologies used are 
also different: medicine, statistics, birth control policy, or anything intended for use as 
a means of population control (Castro, 2004; Foucault, 2000, 2006a; Foucault, Senel-
lart, and Davidson, 2007). Those who “threaten” the survival of the majority are left to 
die by their omission as objects of policy and other technologies (for instance, the 
banning of primary health services for undocumented migrants).
The rationality of biopower is governmentality –in modern Western societies this 
is liberal governmentality–, which includes the set of institutions, analyses, calcula-
tions, and tactics focused on population as the main objective, while political economy 
gives it shape, and security apparatuses are its main instruments (Castro, 2004: 130-
131). Governmentality is not exclusive to the state since these techniques control the 
possible actions of other subjects, or self-directed actions for the domination of plea-
sures and desires. In order to differentiate political governmentality from other types 
of governmentality, Foucault referred to the first as “governmentalization of the state.” 
This process has turned the justice state –the sovereign state ruled by law– into the 
managerial state (Castro, 2004: 130-131), which administrates life through its specific 
techniques. This is why the regulation of migration, the policy intended to define who 
is allowed to enter and remain in a territory and who is not, is a fundamental subject 
of biopolitical analysis.
In fact, biopolitics has become a widespread analytical tool for the examination 
of migration policy as an instrument of contemporary neoliberal governmentality 
(Bastos, 2008; Bigo, 2002; Bolaños, 2009; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Fitzgerald, 
2010; Kalm, 2005; Kelly, 2004; Kunz, 2008; Vaccotti, n/d; Yuing, 2011). Many of these 
works are based on Roberto Esposito’s re-interpretation of Foucault’s biopolitics (2005), 
in which he makes an analogy between the politics of life and the human body’s im-
mune system, saying that the latter fights exogenous threats the same way biopower 
8  Evidently a discussion of biopolitics and its complex relationship with the historical development of capi-
talism and liberalism could be more extensive and sophisticated, but such a discussion would move be-
yond the scope of this article. The interested reader should refer to more extensive and specific sources such 
as Foucault (2000, 2004, 2006a, 2006b); Foucault, Senellart, and Davidson (2007); Castro (2004); and Lemke 
(2010: 190-207).
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fights “pathogen” forms of life threatening the majority. He then distinguishes be-
tween politics over life and politics of life. What we face today is a politics over life, which 
works as an immune system defending the body –the population– through negative 
means that eventually turn against the system itself, excluding other types of life 
from the community. Migration policy is therefore a form of immunization against 
the threat of pathogenic groups (migrants and asylum seekers) (Esposito 2005). 
Biopolitics has also been effective in examining the management of precarious 
lives –to paraphrase J. Butler– in migration and asylum policies in Europe, Australia, 
and the U.S. (Darling, 2009; Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005; Muller, 2004; Owens, 2009; 
Tyler, 2010; Zylinska, 2004). The work of Giorgio Agamben has been fundamental in 
the latter line of research. Agamben returns to the reflections of Foucault on biopoli-
tics and compares it to biological life using the Greek concept of Zoe, that is, the 
simple life separate from, and opposed to, Bios, or political life. Agamben identifies 
the origin in the inclusion of Zoe in political power in the figure of homo sacer. The 
homo sacer is a political-legal figure from the ancient world that refers to a person 
who has been judged and accused of a crime; while they cannot be sacrificed, any-
one who kills them will not be accused of homicide. These people are left completely 
unprotected by the law and their inclusion is solely a result of their exclusion. The 
bare life of homo sacer is subject to the political only by exception. For Agamben, homo 
sacer as the person who can be killed but not sacrificed is the first figure to establish 
the biopolitical power of the sovereign since it subjectivizes the bare life not through 
its inclusion in the legal order except through its exclusion (Agamben, 1998). For 
Agamben, refugees serve as the best representation of the contemporary homo sacer, 
since they are only included in the political and legal domains by means of their ex-
clusion and can be killed without it being considered homicide. The refugee embod-
ies the concept of the bare life, purely biological human existence with no political 
value, and for this reason the protection of this life is removed from the political sphere 
and becomes a strictly humanitarian concern. Detention camps for refugees are 
therefore the new concentration camps and serve to express the totalitarian sophisti-
cation of contemporary biopolitics. 
I agree with the idea that the migration apparatus serves U.S. American biopoli-
tics and is essentially a “defense” against the “threat” of Mexican migration. I also be-
lieve that asylum seekers embody the idea of the homo sacer since they are people who 
exist only because they are outside the law (Agamben, 1998); and that migrants and 
asylum seekers are a pathogen against which immunization (immigration and asylum 
policy) is enforced. However, the focus of this article is different, since it concerns 
more specifically an examination of the use of asylum law in the biopolitics of migra-
tion in the U.S. The article therefore analyzes the biopolitical use of law in practice.
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In Foucauldian terms, law pertains to complementary sovereign and disciplin-
ary powers: while the first results in legal codes, the second implements these codes 
institutionally (Foucault, 2006; Foucault, Senellart, and Davidson, 2007). Neverthe-
less, law is strategically used in biopolitics due to the development of biopower, and 
norms become more important than the judicial system itself. This does not mean 
that law or its institutions tend to disappear, but that the law increasingly serves as a 
norm intended to impose conformism and homogenize, and that judicial institu-
tions are more integrated into a continuum of apparatuses with regulatory functions 
(Castro, 2004: 219). It is a regulatory mechanism in the politics of life and death, even 
if law is used to carry axiological content in the sovereign state, such as the law pro-
tecting refugees.
The article will therefore argue that even though asylum law should not form part 
of biopower, it does. Through its legal texts, asylum discourse in the United States 
serves as a tactic for the regulation of migration, which in turn has economic and po-
litical objectives: to defend U.S. American territory from the threat of Mexican migra-
tion and maintain the credibility of security cooperation between Mexico and the U.S.
the BiopoLiticaL roLe of asyLum Law
According to Foucault, the ideal vehicles of power are discourses, elements, or tacti-
cal blocks used in power relations to construct subjectivities (Castro, 2004: 219), and 
they operate through apparatuses (dispositifs, or the non-discursive instruments 
linked to discourses) maintained through a variety of strategies. Several legal cate-
gories exist in asylum discourse that construct the persecuted subject, and these are 
codified in various legal texts. Asylum is defined in terms of the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its Protocol (1967); with-
holding of removal implements the obligation of non-refoulment established in the 
Convention of Refugees; and prevention of deportation due to a well-founded fear 
of being the subject of torture, is enforced as complementary means of protection 
under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.
A dispositif, or apparatus, is a set of social relationships built around a discourse: 
institutions, laws, policies, disciplines, scientific and philosophical statements, con-
cepts, and moral propositions. As part of the migration apparatus, asylum discourse 
is produced and distributed under the control of large political and economic tech-
nologies such as courts, immigration offices, and law firms (Castro, 2004). Through 
these, asylum discourse in the migration apparatus excludes a subject of asylum a 
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priori if he/she has participated in the persecution of others in connection with one 
or more of the five protected grounds; stayed in the U.S. for over a year at the time of 
the application; or resettled successfully in another country. 
Once a person is eligible for asylum, his/her claim will be successful if he/she 
manage to prove, in terms of the politics of truth in asylum discourse established by 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (ina 101[a] [42]), that he/she has a well-founded 
fear of persecution due to the government’s unwillingness or inability to protect the 
victim from his/her persecutors; and that this persecution is motivated by the victim’s 
race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group. 
These two concepts (the government’s unwillingness or inability to protect and the 
motivation) determine the scope of the construction of the subject of asylum law.
As part of the U.S. migration apparatus, asylum discourse is enforced manage-
rially, although its reproduction, signification, and power techniques resemble those 
of sovereign power, such as courts. In the words of Gibney, “The United States es-
sentially has had no refugee policy as such –only an immigration policy disguised as 
a refugee policy” (2000: 53). Two features of asylum law and its enforcement are 
central to its biopolitical use: the extralegal aspects surrounding its enforcement, 
and the technical legal issues derived from interpretation. 
Extralegal Issues
As stated above, in biopolitics the law serves justice, but it is used to homogenize 
populations. In this case, openly managerial features exist in the enforcement of asy-
lum law that show how instruments intended for the administration of international 
justice, such as the Refugee Covenant included in the ina, are used to regulate im-
migration to the U.S. The biopolitical tactics facilitating migration control are as fol-
lows: splitting the system into affirmative and defensive procedures and the quasi-
legal character of migration administration of justice that leaves ample room for 
subjective and arbitrary decisions. Firstly, the division of asylum into affirmative 
and defensive procedures allows for differential treatment of claimants according to 
their socioeconomic status and gender, which supposedly determines their criminal 
proclivity. Affirmative applicants are those who enter the country with a valid visa, 
or those who overstay their visas and therefore hold no documents authorizing 
them to remain in the country. These claims are reviewed by an asylum officer from 
the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (uscis) and if not approved, they are re-
ferred to an immigration judge of the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(eoir), a branch of the U.S. Department of Justice that fails to operate as a proper 
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court, as will be seen later. Only at this time is the applicant transferred to removal 
proceedings, although his/her application has not been yet rejected. The denial let-
ter explains, “This is not a denial of your asylum application. You may request asy-
lum again before the immigration judge and your request will be considered (with-
out additional re-filing) when you appear before an immigration judge at the date 
and time listed on the attached charging document.” 
Many Mexicans who pass through El Paso courts are in defensive asylum, al-
though they began affirmative procedures. Immigration officers who deny asylum to 
Mexicans in affirmative proceedings do not give in-depth legal arguments when in-
forming them of their decisions. They only state that the applicant has failed to prove 
past or future persecution, but do not explain why. In defensive claims a migration 
officer places the applicant in removal proceedings, and the case goes directly to the 
eoir. Typically, claimants who opt directly for defensive asylum are those who do not 
have a visa and state their intention to seek asylum to an immigration officer at a port 
of entry. In these situations, asylum seekers are sent to detention centers where they 
are held until an immigration court makes a decision, which could take up to five 
years. While awaiting the judge’s decision,9 applicants can request a “credible fear” 
interview, that is, an interview in which they have to provide evidence that their fear 
of persecution is well founded. The judge then either grants or denies asylum and 
proceeds to removal (Rottman, Fariss, and Poe, 2009). 
The success of the claimant’s credible fear interview depends entirely on the 
judge’s perception. This prerogative is granted by the 1996 Real id Act, which, accord-
ing to Cabot, gives judges the “negative credibility decision, with which he can de-
cide that asylum seekers are not credible based on any inconsistencies in the story, 
even inconsistencies that have no bearing on the actual claim of asylum (the color of a 
house, the time of day that something happened, etc.). This kind of subjective as-
sumption is sufficient for a judge to justify dismissing asylum seekers’ testimony.” 
Cabot also claims that inconsistencies such as these are frequent in the case of Mexi-
can asylum seekers, given that “they haven’t seen attorneys, and also many people 
flee the border, actually run to the border; we have people who have been shot and 
[they] take them to the hospital when they get to the border, [they are] cleaned up, 
drugged up, on painkillers, and sent back to the border for their interview; they’re on 
painkillers, hours after being shot, and say things that are mildly consistent with things 
they say in the future, their testimony gets discarded” (2012). She goes on to say that 
9  In December 2009, President Barack Obama determined that asylum seekers able to prove “credible fear” 
of persecution by their country’s government, or by a group the government did not want to control or was 
unable to control, could remain in the U.S. until such time as the asylum application process was complet-
ed. The problem, however, comes when people are required to demonstrate “credible fear.”
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this is an important determining factor in the rejection of cases because, “if you have 
a judge with the preconceived notion that Mexican people should not be given asy-
lum, and with the power to decide that the asylum seeker is just not believable based 
on [small] things . . . then it is incredibly easy for that judge just to say . . . ‘your testi-
mony is not credible’” (2012).
Crystal Massey, a human rights advocate and former researcher at Carlos Spec-
tor’s law firm, which deals with most Mexican cases, claims that the affirmative/
defensive divide has no other objective than to serve as a filter for the type of Mexi-
cans who can access the asylum system; this does not mean they are granted asylum, 
just access to the system. Massey argues that people with visas are usually middle 
class, well-informed Mexicans with the means or the knowledge to obtain a border 
crossing document, or know that stating an interest in asylum at the border will lead 
to them being placed in detention. Massey also claims that young men spend more 
time in detention (men are associated with the drug business or gangs in the biased 
mind of U.S. civil servants or judges). In detention, people are mistreated (they are 
forced to remain in degrading and uncomfortable conditions for long periods) or 
harassed (they are separated from young children and told they could remain sepa-
rated for a very long time) to pressure them to drop their asylum claims.
Secondly, U.S. immigration courts are administrative, managerial bodies that ad-
ministrate migration, rather than disciplinary bodies in charge of controlling sovereign 
power. The quasi-legal or quasi-administrative character of immigration courts makes 
decision-making subjective and arbitrary. In the U.S., they are not constitutional like 
civil or criminal courts where people can claim rights. According to Cabot, immigration 
courts are “something that is court-like; it’s actually an administrative body, and the 
administrative body says okay, immigration benefits are such important things to peo-
ple that we should give people a place that looks like a court basically in order to make 
sure that their rights are more likely to be appealed in this area” (2012). Their decisions 
are appealed with the Board of Immigration Appeals, whose published decisions are 
law only for the circuit where the claim was based. Only when the asylum-seeker ap-
peals a judge’s decision to the Supreme Court does his/her case enter a constitutional 
field. Although these administrative bodies look like courts, law enforcement is relaxed 
and discretionary. In fact, says Cabot, the law “can be changed based on the judge who 
oversees the court. . . . Each particular judge can alter the rules within their own court, 
and so this gives the judges much more discretionary powers than judges in other 
courts in the U.S., criminal courts, civil courts . . . to change the rules to suit their own 
biases and preconceptions than they do in another arenas” (2012).
Interviewees claim that judges evaluating Mexican asylum seekers in the Fifth 
Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi), in detention or at liberty, are tougher 
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than judges in other circuits. According to Iliana Holguín, executive director/attor-
ney at law, at the Diocesan Migrant and Refugee Services, Fifth Circuit judges deny 
asylum in 95 percent of cases, while Ninth Circuit judges (California) grant asylum in 
over 50 percent of cases (2012). Not only that, Fifth Circuit judges have made asylum 
restrictions even tougher, as can be seen in their decisions to narrow particular social 
groups (see below). According to Cabot, judges in the Fifth Circuit are extremely con-
servative and believe that granting asylum to some Mexicans will open the door for 
all Mexicans fleeing violence. This argument, she claims, is easily refuted because 
even if judges admit “people fleeing drug violence” as a group for the purposes of 
asylum, these people still have to prove they are being persecuted, and that this per-
secution is by the state. Furthermore, since “immigration judge decisions are not law, 
they’re not precedential published decisions, so one immigration judge that starts to 
give asylum to people from Mexico fleeing violence doesn’t mean that by law the 
whole border is now open; it’s still a decision-by-decision thing” (2012). 
Another tactic judges use to prevent access to the system is the one-year bar. 
Petitioners become ineligible for asylum if they apply after having been in U.S. terri-
tory for over a year. People submit their asylum application (form I-589) together 
with their testimony and evidence during their first meeting with judges, at their 
“master hearing.” Because judges handle so many cases, there is a delay in case re-
view of over two years (some petitioners who arrived in 2012 will not have their 
master hearing until 2014). According to Holguín, case review is faster in the deten-
tion court, basically because detention centers are privately-run and the government 
has to pay for every asylum seeker detained there, so they try to speed up the pro-
cess to save money. However, cases are often dismissed because no legal advice was 
provided and the one-year bar was ignored. Holguín claims that due to their aware-
ness of this situation, judges are now willing to review cases more quickly. In fact, 
she says, they have made a commitment to review three cases in three and half 
hours, something that also makes it clear that “they already know in what terms 
they’re going to make their decision” (2012).
Technical Legal Issues
In the second place, although extralegal techniques are key to defining the managerial 
status of asylum law, legal texts play a fundamental role in the regulation of Mexican 
migration. Asylum law has truth effects concerning what constitutes an act and a 
victim of persecution, as well as the context in which persecution occurs. It has cre-
ated a politics of truth (the establishment of subjectivities, objects, and concepts that 
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separate true from false) in which the definition of state attribution, responsibility, 
context, and victim excludes many subjectivities, objects, and concepts. The narrow 
interpretation of two legal categories serves as a biopolitical technique for regulating 
Mexican flows: 1) a well-founded fear of present or future persecution due to the 
state’s unwillingness or inability to protect them; and 2) that they are or could be the 
victims of persecution because of their nationality, race, religion, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.
Firstly, fear of persecution is defined as a fear of serious harm and the failure of 
the state to provide protection vis-à-vis this possibility. Persecution could be under-
stood as “the sustained or systematic violation of human rights demonstrative of a 
failure of state protection” (Price, 2006). The level of harm must be severe. In order to 
demonstrate persecution, a person’s experience must be more than simple unpleas-
antness, harassment, or even basic suffering. According to the un Asylum Hand-
book, persecution could be an action by the state or the result of the state’s inability 
to control the criminality of non-state actors (García, 2011; Pickering, 2005). Two in-
terpretations exist of persecution by non-state agents in the face of which the state is 
willing but unable to provide protection. One, the view of protection, in which the 
definition is extended to cover situations where the state of origin is incapable of 
providing the necessary protection, and two, the view of accountability, which es-
tablishes that only when persecution emanates from the state can the person be con-
sidered a refugee (Bruin, 2002). 
However, the involvement of non-state actors is not the main problem facing 
Mexican asylum seekers, as Cabot explains: “That issue, in my opinion at least, is not 
the most pressing issue because in some ways in asylum law this ‘unwilling or un-
able clause,’ it doesn’t even matter for asylum law whether the police are involved 
or not, to some extent because, whether they’re involved, maybe they’re unwilling 
to stop the violence; if they’re not, maybe they’re unable to stop the violence” (2012). 
The non-state actor issue is in fact problematic for protection provided under the 
Convention against Torture since protection is only for people who have been tor-
tured or could be tortured by state officials, or with the acquiescence of the state. If a 
claimant cannot prove persecution on account of one of the five protected grounds, 
this possible avenue of protection is also banned if there is no state involvement.
According to Cabot and fellow attorney Nancy Oretskin, for Mexican claim-
ants, the main issue is to prove the Mexican government’s inability or unwillingness 
to protect its citizens from persecution or torture by state authorities or criminals. As 
Oretskin puts it, in the end, “the key always is, no matter whether political opinion 
or social group, the government or representative of the government is incapable or 
unwilling to protect you. You have to have a tie to the government. . . . So the tying 
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with the cartels, in the missing piece of the U.S. denying to Mexico is the refusal to 
recognize the cartels as the government” (2012). 
In terms of asylum law, the difficulty of proving the Mexican government’s 
complicity with drug cartels has to do with such factors as law enforcement officials 
being on the payroll of cartels, even though the state enforces the Mérida Initiative. 
In order to prove the state’s inability or unwillingness to fight drug cartels, claimants’ 
lawyers submit recommendations to the uscis or eoir from Mexican human rights 
commissions or news clippings reporting that law enforcement officials or soldiers 
directly participated in, or ignored, murders related to the case. However, these are 
not always forthcoming and testimony may be the only available proof. In response, 
asylum authorities use evidence of Mexican or bilateral policy on the fight against 
drug trafficking. In Cabot’s words, “Because there is involvement of the state, but 
clearly the state in Mexico is not a monolithic actor; the state doesn’t just do one thing 
or another; there are loads of different actors within the state itself, you know, the 
office of the president and the military could be saying conflicting things . . . because 
there is so much conflicting action within the government, I mean obviously the 
government is fighting itself at some level, just saying that there is involvement doesn’t 
prove that there is involvement in a specific person’s case” (2012).
Secondly, given the characteristics of the Mexican situation, arguing motivation 
is never straightforward either. As Cabot claims, “When you’re dealing with people 
who are fleeing from drug violence, there’s no obvious group, no obvious ground . . . 
you know, it’s not their race, religion, nationality, so those go out the window” (2012). 
Therefore asylum claimants have only two category options: political opinion and 
membership in a particular social group. However, given the characteristics of the 
war on drugs, the connections to political opinions or social groups are clear only in 
the most traditional cases.
Political opinion refers to “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of 
the State, government, and policy may be engaged” (Buchanan, 2010: 44). Even if the 
applicant has not expressed his/her opinions yet, the strength of his/her convic-
tions leads to the assumption that the applicant will eventually express them and 
will enter into conflict with authorities (Buchanan, 2010). To address this possibility, 
Spector has created the political association Mexicans in Exile, designed to speak out 
against impunity and demand justice for the murders or disappearances of relatives 
of Mexican asylum seekers. Given that the asylum process could take up to five 
years, if people prove political involvement in Mexicans in Exile, they might be able 
to argue future persecution.
So far, however, people who have managed to demonstrate a well-founded fear 
of persecution due to their political opinions are those expressing a political opinion 
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in terms of the ina and the un Convention, that is, typical asylum seekers. In the 
words of Cabot, “For some people fleeing Mexico, there’s political opinion; that ac-
tually works for them, but that’s usually politicians, journalists, or human rights ac-
tivists. So that’s specifically for people who speak out and doesn’t apply just to the 
normal person fleeing violence” (2012). For instance, in September 2010, the U.S. 
government granted political asylum to journalist Jorge Luis Aguirre, director of La 
Polaka.com, when he managed to flee Ciudad Juárez just a few hours after the execu-
tion-style murder of journalist Armando “Choco” Rodríguez and after having received 
an anonymous phone call warning him, “You’re next.” Aguirre offered a political 
rather than legal defense of his case before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime and 
Drugs in Washington during a hearing in March 2009.
Another, similar, case is that of Alejandro Hernández Pacheco, a journalist who 
was also granted political asylum. In August 2011, the Court ruled in his favor after 
he demonstrated credible fear of persecution by federal authorities for denouncing 
their failure to protect him from a drug cartel. In 2010, he had been kidnapped after 
reporting that Gómez Palacio, Durango, jail authorities released prisoners at night 
so that they could carry out cartel-ordered assassinations. Hours after his release, 
federal police informed him he would be meeting then-President Felipe Calderón. 
However, he was instead taken to a press conference where his face and identity were 
revealed to the national media. Another case is that of human rights activist Cipri-
ana Jurado, who managed to demonstrate she was persecuted by army officials due 
to her activism in favor of a family seeking justice for two of its members (two women) 
who were reported missing in the Juárez Valley in 2009. She was granted political 
asylum in June 2011.
Mexican law enforcement officials also have a good chance of making a case for 
political asylum: “Police officers can argue that by reason of their political opinion to 
not associate or cooperate with the drug trafficking business, they have been perse-
cuted or have a fear of persecution. This is a plausible argument given that the con-
cept of political opinion is defined broadly and that some drug trafficking cartels are 
effectively a political force in that they continuously seek to infiltrate government 
institutions, particularly law enforcement departments” (Buchanan, 2010). 
Nevertheless, people who speak out against the drug cartels and are consequent-
ly persecuted by sicarios (hit men) face the greatest difficulties, such as the Morín 
Brothers.10 Since 1989, the Morín brothers have owned a public transport company 
in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, and shortly after its founding they joined a pri-affiliated 
union confederation. In addition to the three brothers, another five family members 
10  The author had access to the legal files of all the cases described here, but the claimants’ identities will not 
be disclosed to protect the safety of the families in question and that of the author. 
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went into the business. In 1997, they operated 10 buses and by 2005 they had re-
ceived another 10 bus concessions. From then on, they began to hire drivers, since 
prior to that they had done the driving themselves.
In June 2008, a drug cartel began to extort them, making death threats and 
warning they would burn their homes and buses if they failed to pay the cartel 
Mex$5 000 a week. The brothers tried to organize union members to avoid making 
these payments and to stage a public protest. However, they were warned that if 
they continued to organize others against the cartel’s interests, their buses would be 
incinerated. One of the brothers suggested the group organize a general strike and 
refuse to provide bus services, thereby exerting pressure on the police. The union 
members present agreed to take action but ultimately were afraid, and so no group 
action was taken at the meeting. A phone call was later received saying that a bus 
had been set on fire and that if they continued to advocate strikes and resist extortion 
the cartel would kill a family member. Shortly thereafter, the son of one of the brothers 
was murdered execution-style in a Juárez bar, and in March 2011 the Morín family 
fled to El Paso. Calling publically on others to organize a united front against extortion 
qualifies as political opinion, according to attorney Carlos Spector, who also believes 
that the Morín brothers were not persecuted on an individual basis but as a family 
with strong political opinions. However, the Morín brothers have been denied affir-
mative asylum and find themselves in defensive proceedings.
There are other cases that appear more like typical cases of political opinion but 
that have nevertheless been rejected, probably due to the general context of drug-
related violence. This is the case of a local perredista (a member of the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution, or prd) who applied for asylum based on a well-founded 
fear of persecution due to his political opinions and the Mexican government’s un-
willingness or inability to protect him. He claimed,
I believe I would be harmed because of my political opinion. I believe this because of 
what I have seen: soldiers who block roads and yank people from their cars and beat 
them, abusing their rights. They have killed people. . . . If a person asks for help or seeks 
justice, that person turns up dead. I believe that either the Mexican government or mili-
tary has intended to send me a message that based on my political position as a council-
man that opposes the actions of the Calderon government I am at great risk of being 
killed, disappeared, tortured, or kidnapped. 
He applied for asylum as part of affirmative proceedings, but his application 
was denied in May 2012 because he allegedly failed to prove past or future persecution. 
He was immediately placed in removal proceedings because his visa had expired in 
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January 2012 and he had remained in the country. He entered through Fabens, Tex-
as, in March 2011, and appeared before an immigration judge on July 17, 2012. This 
local perredista was a friend of the Reyes Salazar family,11 who he had met during 
protests against the Sierra Blanca nuclear waste dump. Both he and the Reyes Sala-
zar family headed the protest. When in the summer of 1998 a 19-year-old mother 
and maquila worker disappeared, the Antinuclear Coalition started working on the 
case, and her body was found a week later. Their demands for justice led to the de-
tention of a man who had also killed another young woman. Josefina Reyes Salazar 
then set up the Committee for Human Rights in the Juárez Valley which the local 
perredista joined. In 2006-2007, he joined Andrés Manuel López Obrador in the fight 
against the privatization of Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Pemex, and in 2008 
he joined Josefina Reyes and Cipriana Jurado in their fight against military abuse. 
During the Calderón administration, at least 11 elected officials, prd candidates, or 
their family members were assassinated in Chihuahua. The local perredista was elect-
ed city councilman in 2007 in Guadalupe Distrito Bravo; however, he only served 
three years of his four-year term because three of his colleagues were murdered dur-
ing this period. While he believes it was the federal police who threatened him and 
his colleagues, he also suspected the Juárez mafias were responsible for the murder 
of his colleagues and relatives.
On the other hand, regarding membership in a particular social group, in most 
cases the reasons cited are not explicitly those of the ina and the un Convention, that 
is, the persecution by sicarios and corrupt law enforcement officials of entire families 
who either refuse to pay extortion or speak out about extortion; or the killing of murder 
victims’ relatives seeking justice for the deceased. More specifically, for the Fifth Cir-
11  A paradigmatic case of Mexican asylum seekers is that of the Reyes Salazar family, who have been 
persecuted both for their political opinions and their family line. Six members of the family have 
been killed since the Joint Chihuahua Operation was launched: Julio César Reyes Salazar (Josefina’s son, 
who was murdered in November 2009); Josefina Reyes Salazar (murdered in March 2010); Rubén Reyes 
Salazar (brother, murdered in August 2010); María Magdalena Reyes Salazar (sister, murdered in July 2011); 
Elías Reyes Salazar; and Luisa Ornelas de Reyes (sister-in-law, murdered in July 2011). Josefina’s remaining 
son, Miguel Ángel, was arrested on organized crime charges in 2008 for alleged links with a drug cartel, but was 
immediately released. The home of Sara, Josefina’s mother, was burned down in her absence. The surviving 
members of the Reyes Salazar family (mother Sara; brother Saúl, with his wife and 3-, 6- and 12-year-old sons; 
sisters Olga, Claudia and Marisela; and nephews Jorge Luis, Ismael, and Ángel) traveled to Mexico City in 
2011 seeking protection from the federal government after they received death threats. The Attorney 
General’s Office placed them in a shelter, but they decided to leave a month later since long-term solutions 
were not offered. The surviving members of the family seized the opportunity to flee to El Paso, Texas, 
where all except Ismael applied for asylum. Ismael refused to leave Mexico and remained hidden in Ciudad 
Juárez, where he has a wife and a child, as well as a former partner and another son. Sara did go to El Paso but 
refused to file for asylum because she did not want to be in a position that would prevent her return to 
Mexico to visit Ismael. However, in June 2012, Ismael received a phone call from his former wife to tell him 
that armed men had visited her and asked about him. He immediately left for El Paso, and finally Ismael and 
his grandmother Sara applied for asylum. In only four years, an entire family was run out of Chihuahua.
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cuit, a particular social group must have the following three key characteristics: so-
cial visibility, immutability, and particularity.
The Fifth Circuit defines visibility as society’s perception of a group as a visible 
social group. Oretskin describes this in the following way: “In the Fifth Circuit of 
Texas where we are, membership of a social group is hard [to demonstrate] because 
you have to prove it is immutable, and you have to show visibility. Visibility is par-
ticipating in protests and pictures. Immutability is a member of the family who has 
been in the media, and that the media covered this around the world because of the 
injustice. How’s that immutable? How can you change that you’re part of that fami-
ly? So the social group is hard. Really hard” (2012).
Immutability refers to people who share an innate or unalterable characteristics 
such as their past, defined by something as basic as their identity that they should not 
be required to abandon (Buchanan, 2010; Pickering, 2005). For example, police offi-
cers  and law enforcement officers in general could be granted asylum on account of 
their membership in particular group because they have a “shared past experience” 
and share “a common immutable characteristic,” which is having been law enforce-
ment officials, a feature that cannot be changed (Buchanan, 2010; García, 2011).
According to Cabot, this is specifically linked to characteristics unrelated to per-
secution itself: “The other thing about a social group is, in order to kind of prevent 
circular logic, . . . your social group cannot be defined by the persecution that it suf-
fers; for example, women who suffer domestic violence cannot be a social group 
because domestic violence is the persecution itself. So, Mexican citizens targeted by 
cartels cannot be a social group because this is being defined by the persecution. That 
prevents us from using what might be the most obvious social group, a fairly visible 
thing. That’s one problem” (2012). Therefore, people who refuse to pay quotas to drug 
cartels, criminal informants, Mexicans returning from the U.S., and business persons 
(wealthy merchants or families) are groups that are too broad to qualify as a “partic-
ular group.” In addition, there is no voluntary relationship or innate characteristic to 
bind its members (García, 2011). 
A possibility for establishing a particular social group for Mexicans is the fami-
ly, since family meets the criteria of a particular social group: “Family membership is 
a characteristic that a person either cannot change (if he or she is related by blood) or 
should not be required to change (if he or she is related by marriage)” (The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2011: 15). Nevertheless, in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, it is not enough to belong to a family of a persecuted person; persecution on 
account of family as a social group seeks “to terminate a line of dynastic succession” 
(The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2011: 7). However, this is much 
tougher in the Fifth Circuit.
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Many people have had their cases turned down in affirmative proceedings when 
trying to prove family as a particular social group, such as the Vázquez family. In 
August 2011, members of the Vázquez family were having their traditional Sunday 
lunch and family gathering at their house in Guadalupe Distrito Bravo when eight 
heavily armed men descended from a black truck and burst into the garden of the 
house where most of the family members were assembled. The unknown men forced 
them to hand over their mobile phones and beat everyone present, women included. 
The men were looking for a three-year old boy, the son of a niece of Marisela Reyes 
Salazar.12 The little boy was considered a Reyes Salazar and therefore had to be elimi-
nated. However, none of the three had arrived for the family reunion that day; since 
they were not present, the men got angry and took another member of the family in 
retaliation. This woman was kidnapped in front of her teenage daughters while her 
partner lay unconscious on the floor after suffering a severe beating. Before leaving, 
the armed men threatened to kill the entire Vázquez family if they failed to leave 
town that same evening. The family appealed for help from the army since they were 
able to identify some of the men and provided a description of the truck used to take the 
woman away. However, the soldiers refused to help, saying they were unable to 
take any action. The soldiers finally agreed to escort 14 members of the Vázquez family 
to the Dr. Porfirio Parra International Bridge, which connects Guadalupe with the 
Texan town of Tornillo, in order for them to apply for asylum. The only mistake the Váz-
quez Family made was being related to the Reyes Salazar family, which has been 
persecuted on account of both their political opinions and their family line. 
This last section of the article serves to show how asylum law serves the biopo-
litical purposes of the U.S. government through the decisions of Fifth Circuit judges 
who refuse to expand the limits of asylum law and consistently use these categories 
to prevent Mexicans from being granted asylum.
concLusion
The data indicate that while undocumented migration has decreased, a new migra-
tion trend has been established: application for asylum. While thousands of people 
have fled their homes and relocated within Mexico, those not protected by the Mexi-
can state seek asylum in the United States. Consequently, asylum law, which usually 
corresponds to sovereign power, begins to play a biopolitical role.
12 See note 11 for details concerning the Reyes Salazar family.
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In particular, certain extra-legal and technical legal issues allow this to happen. 
First, the extra-legal issues are related to the affirmative/defensive divide in the asy-
lum procedure, which serves as a filter through which only middle-class Mexicans 
can avoid detention. In addition, the “court-like” nature of the system permits judg-
es’ subjectivity to be used. Second, the well-founded fear of persecution, the govern-
ment’s unwillingness or inability to protect victims from their persecutors, and per-
secution for reasons of political opinion or for membership in a particular social 
group are all used as biopolitical tactics. Judges choose not to expand the legal con-
cept of asylum and prefer to narrow their interpretations as a means of denying this 
option to people fleeing violence. Both the extra-legal and technical issues evident in 
asylum enforcement indicate that evidence exists suggesting that the U.S. govern-
ment is using asylum law biopolitically to keep Mexicans out of its territory. 
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